Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
CGU Faculty Publications and Research

CGU Faculty Scholarship

1-1-1997

Contemptus Mundi Means "...Bound for the
Promised Land...": Religion from the Site of
Cultural Marronage
Vincent L. Wimbush
Claremont Graduate University

Recommended Citation
Wimbush, Vincent L. "Contemptus Mundi Means "...Bound for the Promised Land...": Religion from the Site of Cultural Marronage."
The Papers of the Henry Luce III Fellows in Theology, Vol.2, ed. Jonathan Strom. Association Of Theological Schools, 1997. 131-161.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the CGU Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for
inclusion in CGU Faculty Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please
contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

Wimbush / 131

Contemptus Mundi Means
“...Bound for the Promised Land...”:
Religion from the Site
of Cultural Marronage
Vincent L. Wimbush

Union Theological Seminary
New York

On Being Both Problem and Promise:
Finding My Scholarly Self and Voice

Th

e basic assumption behind this project is that all humanistic
inquiries more or less explicitly involve self-discovery.
I have chosen to try to be more rather than less explicit. I have realized for some time now that I am both a problem and a promise for
the primary field in which I was academically socialized: biblical
(New Testament) studies as defined and practiced by the guilds of
biblical scholars in North America.1 I have provided enough evidence that I can “play the game” that the guilds require in terms of
publications, research projects, and general scholarly orientation.
And as such things go, and for whatever they are worth, I have been
appropriately “rewarded” or “affirmed” by these guilds. There are
even times, though not very often, when it seems that I along with
some others quite paradoxically represent both the promise and
present problem of still very conservative guilds, which have almost
no members who are persons of color and thus lack their influence
and voice. Nevertheless, through my publications, teaching, and
lectures, through the guild politics and guild initiatives that I have
either prompted or supported, I have consistently represented part
of the outsider’s/newcomer’s critique and the potential undermining
of much that these guilds have long represented.
Three anecdotes help make the point. Anecdote one: Several
years ago, during a luncheon in his honor, a very distinguished biblical scholar said to me that he had been watching my career development, was impressed by my growth, and thought that I would really
go places one day if I would but stay the course—that is, not get
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distracted by “trendy” movements. The larger context of conversation
that day about the guild made it clear to me that things “trendy” in
the mind of this colleague included almost all those things that had
initially drawn me to and had continued to hold my interest in the
guild! Looking me squarely and seriously in the face, this scholar
had not an inkling of an idea just how patronizing and racist he
sounded; he actually thought himself the liberal-progressive and
came close to offering himself as role model, even mentor.
Anecdote two: In informal conversation at a recent conference of
historians of the early church, a female colleague of my generation
reported the ironic and histrionic reaction of an older internationally recognized male colleague. Upon facing the prospect of a young,
recently “doctored” African-American female with clear and up-front
interests in “black hermeneutics” joining him as a colleague, he is
reported to have said in words that only he could have uttered:
“But she would change the whole complexion of the program!” The
emphasis, incredibly, is mine and that of the female colleague reporting this incident—not the senior colleague’s. This person reportedly
did not have a clue about the ironic, naive, and racist nature of his
remarks. Academic biblical studies of the type that he had been associated with for decades and his program could not possibly have
conceptual and intellectual room for the likes of the young woman
referenced. To add to the poignancy of the situation, this particular
conference was, except for me, totally without persons of color.
Anecdote three: Actually, this one is the most frightening and
poignant for me. It points to no one particular incident but rather
represents in a less dramatic but no less serious manner the lingering challenge I face as a biblical scholar and historian of religion. It
is the now decades old sentiment expressed in reaction to curricular
and conceptualization reform efforts that is most depressing. Biblical scholars, most especially those with appointments in graduate
schools with doctoral students, argue that the academic study of
the Bible should be taught only according to certain paradigms
and certain critical methods. No matter how creative and radical a
particular scholar’s work might be, somehow the reigning paradigms
for doctoral work in biblical studies are for the most part quite resistant to change, notwithstanding some adjustments here and there.
The European, particularly German, inheritance, remains clear and
intact. Despite all the newer postmodern methods, there is still the
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basic emphasis on the historical-, literary-, and theological-critical
exegesis of ancient texts and the reconstruction of ancient history.
The agenda is ostensibly to be for the most part “scientific” and
“objective” in interpretation, a reflection of solidarity with Western rationalistic Enlightenment assumptions, as well as a defense
against the long-standing ecclesiastical hegemony of interpretation.
But there is delicious irony in the development of the critical
study of the Bible in reaction to the bias of ecclesiastical readings.
The popular assumptions about the split between church and
academy are usually facile and seriously miss the point, especially
concerning biblical scholarship. Exegesis in the history of biblical
scholarship, no matter what the methodological or hermeneutical
games played or no matter how sophisticated, critical, or obscure
they are, has become fundamentally an insider’s activity, the biblical
exegete functioning much like the shaman in “primitive” religions.2
There has actually been very little of biblical or early church scholarship—Western European Protestant, Euro-American Protestant
and Catholic, bourgeois, capitalist, and modernist—that has not
been the activity of the cultural and/or ecclesiastical insider. To be
sure, there have along the way been controversies and squabbles
between church and academy. But these have not fundamentally
threatened any particular dominant sociopolitical order or religious/
theological position. On the contrary, the dominant focus on the
texts in academic biblical studies actually has come to reflect and
support the Euro-American cultural domestication, naturalization,
and co-optation of biblical and early church traditions. Ecclesiastical
control of interpretation in some places over time has been forced
on account of general socio-political, including religious, reforms
and pressures to relax a bit. But the history of scholarship suggests
that biblical scholarship had far less influence upon the dominant
religiocultural ethos than it has been influenced by it.
But that the rationalistic, “scientific” study of the Bible has
clearly served and still serves an agenda that is culture-specific cannot be denied. The “critical” methods that define academic biblical
studies now function not so much to analyze and criticize the complex
of traditions that produced and were in turn set in motion by the
texts, but far more often, merely to support a type of naturalization—that is, Europeanization and Euro-Americanization of things
Christian. In either their atomistic literary/historical or sometimes
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somewhat broader but still culturally captive theological approaches,
the agenda seems to be merely to throw light on certain aspects of
or “facts” about Christianity which after more than a century of
such efforts, has been taken for granted as the historical stream of
religious traditions in the modern Western world.
Without several conceptual steps backward from the details of
ancient texts and histories, and then several steps toward a problematization of the phenomenon of “scripturalizing”3 itself and of
the sociocultural, political effects of the traditions produced by it,
the agenda of biblical studies can be seen to service the ideological
interests of the dominant, literate, middle- and upper-class religiousconfessional communities. Such an agenda is not wholly indefensible,
but it cannot be claimed to be other than what it is by virtue of the
paradigms and constructs that determine it: a discourse in service
of a rather specific demographic slice of society. It should not claim
to be more than that.
The anecdotes above and the sentiments that grow out of them
make the point about promise and problem very clear. They point
to the complexity of my views about, participation in, reception by,
and effect on the scholarly guilds to which I belong. Such complexity
is due to many factors, not the least of which is the different site of
enunciation4 I occupy—a site not altogether unique or privileged,
but certainly different from that site that has been assumed to be of
central importance since the beginnings of modern biblical scholarship and early church history in Europe and in North America. The
site for the origination, development, and flowering of EuropeanNorth American academic biblical studies was and remains the
nexus between the (European state supported and North American
private, elite) academy and the (European state- and North American
cultural Protestant “high”) church.
Again, I occupy a different site of enunciation and interpretation; I have been and remain outside the dominant and privileged
circle of tradition, orientation, and discourse in the United States. In
spite of my academic socialization experience in the Harvard New
Testament doctoral program and in spite of my teaching experiences
in schools historically that have been identified with mainstream
religious, theological, and intellectual views, my own rather different
views about biblical studies and early church history as discourse
were fated sooner or later to emerge from their years of submersion
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in academic-political-cultural captivity and seek to be heard and
read. My issues and questions about the Bible are different simply
because of who I am and whence I come, because of those to whom
I speak and those with whom I live. It is simply no longer possible
for me to engage the Bible, or the world for that matter, through the
categories and constructs and assumptions of others, certainly not
the Euro-American academic-theological paradigm for the engagement of the Bible.
So I cannot begin simply with the text, with the Bible, as scholars
of the New Testament and early church studies on the whole claim
they must do, as though it were clear why the text is important and
should be engaged, nor simply in some part of the Western construct
of “late antiquity,” as though it were agreed why that period is pivotal. Nor can I begin research, as biblical studies and early church
history have since their modern beginnings, with the unconfessed,
unproblematized concerns and assumptions of Europe and white
America. I must begin in my world, with my world. I must begin with
the notion that the Bible as my contemporaries and I have it, is not
an ancient but a modern, a late twentieth-century, document. This is
because as an African American—a member of the African diaspora
that has had to undergo and survive America—I am a “modern.”5
Thus I must begin with the fact of the sociopolitical givenness and
subsequent historical cultural transformation of that givenness of
the Bible in the world into which I was born, in which I first discovered and strove to cultivate my self. No reference to ancient texts or
histories can be justified or can make sense to me at this juncture
unless there is first a coming to terms with the cultural givenness
and cultural engagement and manipulation of such in my present.
Very few other matters are more important to me than the understanding of this matter.
Biblical Studies as Concern with My Present
This essay is an exercise in a type of religious criticism—namely,
analysis of an aspect of some sociocultural representations and some
sociopolitical effects of religion in contemporary culture and society.
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The stated interests and objectives of such criticism are deliberately
broad; they determine neither the particular disciplinary or field
orientations and methods to be employed, nor the foci or twists that
should characterize the project. My identity and social location as
a “modern,” forty-something African-American male, a member of
a diasporic community that has had to endure the New World and
western European hegemony in general, including its legitimating
religious world-views and traditions, and my identity and social location as a historian of religion with training in the New Testament
and early Christianity are determinative of the type of engagement,
foci, and twists with which I engage religious criticism.
No one aspect or part of my identity or social location in isolation
determines the character of what follows. Therefore, this essay—and
the intellectual project it announces and outlines—should not be too
quickly categorized by readers. As an intellectual project it should be
classified neither as simply African-American studies with a strange
foray into the New Testament and early Christianity, nor as simply
New Testament or early Christian studies with a curious Afrocentric
nod. Not only are my identities more complex—not simply multiple,
but actually overlapping and interactive, fluid and dynamic—than
such labeling would suggest, but neither classification is for me
personally, intellectually or professionally appealing or fulfilling.
The categories juxtaposed but left unproblematized are too restrictive, too much a patchwork, an artificial collapsing of two different
discourses that are still too often found to be static and predictable,
with agenda that do not and perhaps very likely cannot accommodate
one another. At any rate, they simply do not capture or reflect who
I am and am becoming nor what I want to argue. Each, standing
alone and unproblematized, forces me to deny my complex self and
my recognition of the complexities—the origins and development,
the diversification, the overlapping—of culture, culture formation
and culture criticism. One without the other renders me intellectually, psychically, and spiritually empty or dishonest. Separation of
the two is too high a price for me or anyone like me to pay.
I simply cannot engage in an intellectual project about African
Americans that will not allow me to draw upon my training and
sensibilities as a historian of Christian origins. Nor can I work on a
project in early Christianity that will not afford me the opportunity
to reconceptualize the phenomenon of Christianity as historical-
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cultural construction by taking into consideration the historical and
contemporary manipulations, interpretations and representations of
it in religion-soaked, Christian, Bible-believing America, including
African America, which has always in different ways and to different
effect, been in pursuit of the (biblical) “primitive.”6 This means, of
course, that the project to which this essay points must be defined
neither as New Testament/Early Christian studies insofar as such
a label implies that the appropriate agenda must ultimately be limited to antiquarianism or exegesis or culturally-captive theological
discourse and interests, nor as African-American studies insofar as
its agenda is ultimately only racial-ethnic cheerleading. I reject the
tendencies in both discourses—found not everywhere, but enough
in evidence to warrant the making of the point—toward fantastic,
often uncritical claims about uniqueness. And I have no interest
whatsoever in being part of those discursive formations that lead
some unwittingly, others with a defensive vengeance, to support
with abandon or without flinching essentialist or foundationalist
positions.
I can no longer intellectually justify the writing of exegetical
commentaries because they require me conceptually to privilege, to
begin and end with, another conceptual and ideological place and
agenda, with ancient texts and with ancient times and the methods
deemed appropriate for their interpretation, a place alien to where
I am psychically and intellectually located, foreign to what I am
and am becoming. It is not that the interpretation of Luke or Paul
or Augustine, the story of Perpetua, or the polemics of Athanasius
is unimportant; rather, such interpretation must be relativized in
importance, removed from its historically foundationalist position.
No longer can it simply for me be considered the obvious (canon-,
biblical-theological-, or tradition-mandated) endpoint. Its importance
for me must now be established or justified, not presumed. And even
if and when this is done, such an object of attention can be only a
part of a larger, more complex cultural-critical intellectual project.
It can be henceforth neither the beginning nor the end point of a
project, only a middle part in the quest to come to terms with the
complex present always in search of a past.
It may seem immediately obvious to some why I as an African
American might have interest in the diverse intellectual discourse
that has come to be called African-American studies. But precisely
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because the matter may be thought to be so obvious—the interest
in the self-discovery, the racial-cultural, ethnic cheerleading as it
has been called by less-than-friendly detractors—it is all the more
important to me that African-American studies not be embraced
without including, even privileging, religion, especially the AfricanAmerican religious folk traditions and orientations. Such privileging should inspire and warrant historical, phenomenological and
comparative study to a degree that would more likely make the
religious world that shaped me recognizable and subject to more
credible and honest criticism and reform. In addition, the extent to
which African-American religious ways are fathomed, a fascinating
and special, if not unique, window to religiocultural transformation
in general is opened.
I resonate very much with what historian and religion theorist
Charles Long has argued about some matters pertinent here. One
example is particularly illuminating: Long reports that when he
was collecting some of his seminal essays for publication in the
well-received book Significations, he, a well-recognized and highly
respected scholar of long-standing who is also African American, had
to stress that his wide-ranging essays—some of which include discussion of African-American religions, but all of which touch on the
larger problems of theory and method in the study of religion—not
be labeled and pitched simply as “Black Studies.” Long’s opposition,
characteristically blunt with little possibility for any set of ears to
miss the point, represented no embarrassment at all with respect
to black studies, or things black in general. Quite the contrary, Long
makes clear that the history of religions was undertaken by him
as part of his quest to understand and come to terms with himself
as a black man in America. This quest was not and could not have
been undertaken by him within just any theoretical framework or
set of assumptions. The study of things black within a theoretical
framework and set of assumptions that begins with black existence
as pathology, for example, would not do. Nor was for him appropriate
to countenance that type of inquiry or discourse or historiographic
tradition in which black existence did not figure at all or, if so, merely
as exotica or caricature.
No, Long’s agenda was to conceptualize and analyze homo religiosus—the religious ways of human life, religious orientations,
and religious impulses in general—in a manner that the religious
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ways of black folk could and must be registered so that they could be
analyzed in their own right but also rendered comparable to other
religious orientations and impulses. The aim seems to have been to
find a way to think about black religious existence so that it could
be an authentic and powerful exemplum of historical existence in
general and thereby contribute to the definition and shape of the
theoretical paradigm for the investigation and understanding of
the larger comparable universal phenomenon: historical human
religious existence. Long ventured not so much to practice a black
history of religions (as a part of black studies or black theology) as
to conceptualize and practice the history of religions in a manner
that black religious orientations could be rendered more accessible
and understandable and could inform and shape the discipline, and
thereby inform and shape world human discourse about important
matters, as well come to a clearer understanding of the world that
shaped him. He wrote:
My concern for the meaning of the religious reality of black
Americans is obviously part and parcel of my scholarly discipline, the history of religions. This academic choice itself
was probably rooted in a deeper, unconscious desire to make
sense of my life as a black person in the United States. I was
attracted to this scholarly orientation, for it was the only
discipline that responded to the religious experience and
expressions of my origins in the black community of this
country. This in itself was illuminating. A note was struck
when I felt a recognition of reality from my community of
origins in the religious experiences and expressions of others
far and near. There was, I felt, a mode of making sense of the
experiences of my tradition that did not begin with a methodology of pathology, one of the primary American cultural
and social scientific languages about blacks. I perceived that
there was a structure for the universal in the human world
that . . . expressed an opening for the authentic expression
of others. Religion thus became the locus for a meaning that
carried an archaic form; it was a root meaning and could thus
become the basis for radical critical thought.7
According to Long, the study of religion meant beginning with
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the modern situation, specifically with African Americans and their
religious situation as those who were forced to undergo the making
of the “New World.” It also meant problematizing that situation,
relating it to the situation of others in the present and in the past.
And it meant paying particular attention to what it means that the
United States is the context in which certain religious orientations
take place and certain religious formations are in evidence.
An African-American historian in touch with his or her hyphenated identity or alienation brought on by existence in the
United States cannot avoid seeing the imperative of beginning every
historical interpretive and analytic project with the problematic
present in which the very presence of the African disturbs or interrupts the spinning of the (Euro-) American “medievalism” and its
exceptionalist-foundationalist myth. In fact, all critical inquiry by
African Americans must come to terms with what Long has rather
euphemistically termed the “involuntary presence” of Africans, with
what it means to be here, to think and live in what is the United
States.
Although, as far as I know, Long has never characterized his
work in this way, I would say that his influence, even if it was not
his stated deliberate agenda, was essentially the Americanization of
the critical and comparative study of religion, certainly in terms of
the twists he gave to the theorizing and problematizing of religion.
Inspired by and complementing his quest to understand himself
as part of the diasporic black presence in the United States, Long’s
focus on the United States provided a challenge to the comparative
study of religion to consider the drama and pathos, the poignancies and ironies, the idealisms and the pathologies, the diversity of
peoples, traditions, and expressions, the alternation between the
archaic and the modern (and now an admixture of the two in the
postmodern), the innovations and conservatisms, and the self-styled
radicalisms, traditionalisms, and fundamentalisms that have come to
characterize the United States. These features serve as springboard
and intellectual impetus for the critical and comparative analysis
of religion, and as such put a rather different spin on it.
Although biblical studies is generally and perhaps by necessity
a conservative field and far less susceptible than most fields to the
challenges being discussed here, I approach my work in biblical
studies along similar lines. For such a field of inquiry to continue to
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interest me as one who is conscious of his “involuntary presence” in
the United States, it must be responsive to, or at least not hinder my
exploration of, the study of the Bible construed as a type of cultural
criticism—an analysis of the religious world-views and expressions
of the contemporary (United States) American culture. This need
grows out of my interest in understanding and coming to terms with
the religious world-views and expressions of the African-American
world that shaped me and that represents a particular socioreligious
formation in it own right.
As is the case with a significant part of historically Protestantdominated American culture in general, African-American religious
culture has historically defined itself through the visions and rhetorics of the Bible. That the particular biblical visions and rhetorics
privileged by African Americans would be different, or that the particular interpretive spins placed on the biblical visions and rhetorics
emphasized in “Bible-soaked” America would be different for African
Americans than for white Protestant America, should occasion no
surprise. The Bible has assumed different and often contradictory
roles among different groups at different points in their formation
throughout American history. That this has been and continues to
be the case, despite the realities of so-called secularization and social and religious diversification, suggests all the more why biblical
studies as religious criticism, as critical analysis of the religious, its
historical and contemporary expressions, orientations, and political
effects in American culture, ought to be imperative. The rhetorics
and visions of the Bible as a part of such investigation will make an
enormous difference not only in the manner in which a significant
segment or aspect of American culture is interpreted, but also in
the construal of biblical studies itself.
The dominant orientations in biblical studies in the United
States—historical and literary and liberal and conservative—assume that the Bible is important and should be the bottom line of
interpretation, requiring ever-more exacting, more sophisticated,
and more nuanced methods in correlation to the many different
agenda and sites of interpretation. In the United States especially,
differences in methods, conflicts within schools of interpretation, and
controversies over substantive interpretive positions have abounded,
even exploded, over the century of critical biblical interpretation,
particularly during the last three decades. Yet on the part of biblical
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scholars there has been in comparison little or no fathoming of the
issue of the function of the Bible itself in the culture, on the role of the
Bible as culture-making, culture-transforming, culture-legitimating,
and culture-opposing force.8 The guild of biblical scholars in the
United States has tended on the whole not to focus attention on
such matters.9 In point of fact, the guild has generally rewarded only
those who have been consistently preoccupied with the busyness of
interpretation of the trees. Interest in the whole forest, especially in
the highest sites of the guild, is frowned upon. In demonstrating any
serious interest in the forest as phenomenon one can be labeled as
something other than a biblical scholar: a theologian (!), a philosopher, or a historian. I have on several occasions heard it said about
me that my interest in the history of African- American biblical
interpretation was evidence of my move away from biblical studies.
Notions about the purview of the biblical scholar are so narrow, so
traditional, and so entrenched that even conservative interests in
and engagements of extracanonical literature are in some quarters
viewed as suspect. Attention to the details of the texts or other material evidence for supposedly nonjudgmental, nonsectarian, scholarly
reconstructive purposes is part of the official guild self-definition;10
it is certainly the reigning cry or at least the reigning assumption
and value that helps define the authentic card-carrying member
of the guild. The proffering of bigger pictures may be sometimes
tolerated, sometimes addressed to a degree by a generation or by a
wing of the guild across several generations. It is somewhat ironic
to me that those few who do address broader issues and questions in
forms of biblical theologies are held in disdain for their theological
conservatism by the minimalist exegetes and scientistic historians.
But the truly amazing thing is that few bigger pictures or proposals
seem to infect the basic conservative structure and conceptualization of the most respected doctoral programs in biblical studies. The
programs—as opposed to the work of some individuals and some
small working groups—seem almost totally immune to such efforts.
If there were not so much evidence for the low level of critical consciousness among scholars about such matters, one might be led to
wonder whether there were not some sort of collusion in the guild
to delegitimize concern about broader issues.
Given the guild’s basic preoccupation with the aesthetics of
biblical literatures and/or their trustworthiness as sources for
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histories, and given its refusal to encourage pursuit of the larger
religious- and cultural-critical issues, the guild of biblical scholars
can be argued to represent an obfuscating conservative agendum
that may not have the intent but certainly has the effect of further
legitimizing establishment culture by protecting for its purposes a
certain character of religious tradition and orientation. Such selfdefinition and function are poignantly and ironically not unlike one
aspect of the agenda embraced and pursued in several strands of
biblical tradition itself.
Construed as the “classics” of religious and theological studies,
such that its position within larger theological and some religious
studies curricula is foundational and privileged, biblical studies
remains uncritical and unproblematized. As such, it is not open to
postcolonial and postmodern questions about the cultural and political functions and effects of the Bible in American and other cultures
in the modern world, as well as the multicultural phenomenon of
scripturalizing in general. This more conservative orientation and
self-definition reflects the guild’s position vis-à-vis the center of the
dominant cultural order. What else can the guild-sanctioned agenda
for biblical scholars—making translucent biblical literatures and
reconstructing biblical histories for politically dominant churches
and society—signify but the assumptions that contemporary (U.S.)
culture and society are somehow historical representations and ideological extensions of ancient biblical culture, requiring only degrees
of mediation, or, conversely, that the chasm between the Bible and
the present is so wide and unnegotiable that the status quo might as
well obtain? The agenda that defines the work of the biblical scholar
primarily in terms of attention to the literary, historical, and other
details assumes that a problematizing of the Bible in the culture is
either unnecessary or unfeasible. But only a culture that assumes
that it is the representation and ideological legatee of the Bible could
wade into the details as though the only challenge were the establishment of the correct text or the discovery of the correct methods
by which the correct interpretation of the text could be discerned
and promulgated. The larger picture and the larger issue having to
do with the continuing modern cultural and political functions and
effects of the Bible in the culture are not engaged because these
matters are assumed to be part of membership within the dominant
culture.11

144 / Contemptus Mundi
It is this uncritical preoccupation with the details of the Bible
without attention to the big cultural-political picture that it represents and has helped create, all in the interest of providing legitimate ideological and religious cover for the dominant status quo,
that makes biblical studies problematic for me. My identification as
outsider, as member of a postcolonial, diasporic community, means
that I can hardly make the assumptions that the dominant American
culture makes about the nexus between the Bible and American
culture, specifically, about the role of the Bible in the formation and
legitimation of dominant American culture.
But what does this mean for those who were defined as “other”
and marginal—especially the racial “other”—in Europe and America? As survival to marginals in colonial contexts has meant taking
an ideologically critical and resistant stance toward the dominant
society and culture, so the Bible, insofar as it has been embraced and
pressed into ideological service by the dominant society and culture,
must be problematized. It has been viewed as a whole statement
that is facilitating either of liberation or of the other than liberating
status quo.
Following Long, it is clear that any serious thinking about
African Americans and their culture and world-views and about
the African presence in the New World can hardly be thought of
without a consideration of religion.12 Because of what America has
come to mean and how America was ideologically, discursively, and
politically formed, and because of the cultural openness and adaptability, including religiously “musical” sensibilities on the part of
African peoples, any consideration of the religious ways of black folk
in America cannot possibly leave out of consideration the Bible in
African-American cultural formation.13
As both discourses are pressed into service to help clarify
matters regarding the character and political effects of religion in
America, they are changed in their focus and orientation. Biblical
studies should no longer have as its single focus ancient texts or
ancient communities; (African-) American studies should have as
its interpretive focus the religious element, in particular the Bible,
as part of the effort to get beyond focusing merely on great persons
and the like, to an effort to chart the history of the popular search
for meaning, affirmation, and social power. The project that collapses these two discourses would need to have as its starting point
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not the example of a situation or community or personality of the
eighth century B.C.E. or the second century C.E., nor the teachings
and exhortations of any ancient biblical text. The starting point
must be a site within contemporary culture, with special attention to the matter of the particular predilections, world-views, and
orientations of such a site as they come into focus through and are
informed by biblical interpretation. Such an agenda, which would
be my understanding of religious criticism, removes the Bible and
biblical interpretation from their privileged foundationalist perch
and conservative legitimating functioning in the dominant culture
and society evidenced most strikingly in popular religion and culture
and in most theological and religious studies curricula.14
So in its nonfoundationalist position, the Bible would not figure
at the beginning or at the end, but in the middle, of the analysis,
important only as it helps explain the character of cultural, in this
case, American rhetorics, American political, and other orientations.
There is to be no effort to understand what any biblical text “means”
or “meant” apart from the contemporary cultural interests in it. In
the religious criticism here advanced, contemporary cultural interests alone, not the ancient qua the ancient, nor appeals to religious
tradition or authority, to general canonical mandates and so forth,
provide the impetus for study of the Bible.
So to my biblical studies colleagues I say—echoing only the form
and function of the words that reportedly defined and focused Bill
Clinton’s first presidential campaign—it’s religion (whatever and
all that this complex reference entails), not the text, that we should
focus upon like a laser beam.15 The text should be understood only
as symbol, as mediator of the transcendent.16
But how might or should we begin our differently understood
work of biblical (New Testament) studies and the history of early
Christianity that displaces and relativizes the text? The Bible—to
state again as clearly as possible the thesis that governs this essay—
will be understood first and primarily as a late twentieth-century
document or phenomenon, not as an ancient one. The importance of
the views of any particular ancient text or ancient writer is to be
established only upon consideration of the engagement of the Bible
among contemporaries. Thus, we should begin biblical studies with
our contemporary religious situation—analyzed with a view to discerning and critiquing its textures, as well as its textualizations.
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Surely, interpreters will begin at different places, stressing or
noting different contemporary issues or problematics; this is appropriate and is to be expected. Each interpreter simply must be
clear and honest about why it is that he or she begins at certain
points and puts stresses at certain points along the way. I want to
state as clearly as I can that my agenda is to try to understand the
puzzle that is the persistence in the United States of a type of religious orientation that can initially and generally be characterized
as “otherworldly.” Because the persistence of such an orientation
among African Americans has been much noted, and because African
Americans constitute the most intimate world that I know, it seems
important to focus attention on them. The volumes and articles and
essays devoted to African Americans, including African-American
Christianity, have not to date been able to answer my questions about
what accounts for the religious orientation of African Americans. I
want to know not merely who did certain things, when and under
what circumstances certain things happened, but, more important,
how and why—how and why displaced, enslaved, marginalized
people could come to embrace a certain type of religious vision and
religious rhetoric and orientation. What was it about the displaced
Africans, what was it about America, and what was it about “Christianity” that accounted for the persistence of a particular vision
and representation of “Christianity” in America and among African
Americans? These questions require attention, if for no reason other
than to come to terms with a still important if not dominant aspect
of American culture. But they also help me to understand (in the
sense that Charles Long meant it) who and why I am.
Because of the “involuntary presence” of African Americans in
the United States, it is impossible to understand the “otherworldly”
orientations of African Americans without an understanding of the
same orientations of what was the larger and dominant culture.
Each world influenced and shaped the orientation of the other.17 Yet
there certainly were early on in United States history differences
in the developments between the two worlds—and in time beyond
them. It is on account of its role as one of the primary contemporary
carriers of religious otherworldliness in the United States that the
African American history of difference that will be the focus in this
essay.
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Modern-Day Persistence of Otherworldiness:
The American Religion
A persistent and puzzling feature of the still dominant EuropeanAmerican culture that continues to have enormous cultural and
political ramifications and therefore begs explanation and criticism
is its history of contempt for, or at least denial of, in much of its
rhetoric, an unmediated European past as its major self-definitional
point of reference. This is puzzling because it is clear at the same
time that the European heritage is also fully embraced in order to
establish for internal domestic politics a certain hegemony in particular areas of American cultural life. Yet according to its mythos,
the United States is different, even unique: in the escape from what
was perceived as the oppression, contradictions, and limitations of
the Old World that was Europe, and preferring to see what is now
considered part of North America as “new” and “virginal,” that is, a
world existing without a natural, temporal history, without peoples
or without peoples rich in complexities and tradition, many of those
Europeans who escaped or otherwise left their homeland and “discovered” the land that is now America wanted to start over in almost
every conceivable sense of the term. The intention was somewhat
naive: the Europeans in the New World reinscribed and ratified
Old-World traditions and merely translated them into New-World
situations.
Yet curiously consistent with the aims of many to constitute a
new world, there is discernible throughout the history of the new
Americans a curious rhetorical and ideological turning away from
the past associated with Europe. America could not be “America”—
unique, God’s experiment, the world’s peacekeeper, patrolman,
“Captain America,” humankind’s last chance, and so the mythos
goes— without renouncing or denying a significant part of the past.
So any attempt to understand America and any social-cultural
minority formations within it, must, it seems to me, fathom the
complex development behind the embracing of and contempt for the
Old World as the basis of the formation of the American self and
orientation in the world. Here it is obvious that religion has figured
rather prominently.
The role of religion in the dramatic formation of the American
self has always been stressed in interpretations of the larger society.
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But a recent interpretive analysis by literary critic Harold Bloom
has done more to provoke my thinking about the nexus between a
dominant contemporary American religious self-definition and orientation and the different pasts that have shaped this self-definition
and orientation than any other I can name. Bloom’s analysis in his
book The American Religion: The Emergence of the Post-Christian
Nation18 provides for me a provocative springboard for an analysis
of the American socioreligious situation that at the same time helps
account for African-American religious ways and traditions in a
manner that goes beyond the still usual additive or exotic primitive
approach. To Bloom’s arguments I now turn as a way to help the
reader understand what has motivated my (re)turn to the past that
is biblical, specifically Christian, antiquity.
Bloom also defines his work as “religious criticism,” involving
the characterization and critique of expressions of the religious in
American culture. In The American Religion Bloom delves into what
he understands to be an important defining aspect of the American
religious psyche through a study of the past—the past that has
aspects of Greco-Roman antiquity. In an effort to account for the
origins and orientation of the dominant strand of “American religion,” Bloom turns to some of the transcendental visions, impulses,
and movements of Greco-Roman antiquity—Christianity, Judaism, and Gnosticism. Bloom argues with a boldness that only an
outsider to the field of religious and theological studies could bring
to the issues that the dominant strand of contemporary “American
religion”—otherworldly and radically individualistic, conservative,
and mostly, although not limited to, the circles of fundamentalist
Christians—is ideological heir to the Gnosticism of late antiquity.
As always, Bloom articulates his position with a panache that in a
few passages I find hard to resist:
Religion, in the ostensibly Protestant United States,
is something subtly other than Christianity . . . . we are
post-Protestant, and we live in a persuasive redefinition of
Christianity . . . . A blend of ancient heresies and nineteenth
century stresses, the American Religion moves towards the
twenty-first century with an unrestrained triumphalism,
easily convertible into our political vagaries . . . .
And the American Religion, for its two centuries of existence,
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seems . . . to be irretrievably Gnostic. It is a knowing, by and
of an uncreated self, or self-within-the-self, and the knowledge leads to freedom, a dangerous and doom-eager freedom:
from nature, time, history, community, other selves.19
This is a fascinating intellectual argument for a number of
reasons. As a model of a type of religious criticism it provides opportunity for the scholar of religion, especially the historian of religion,
to reframe normally narrowly focused technical and antiquarian
work into reflection on modern and contemporary issues. But the
most serious challenge has to do not merely with what is the matter
of relevance, or with what is or is not interesting; it has to do with
that old assumption on the part of the historian that the past—in
this case late antiquity in general, the New Testament and early
Christianity in particular—is important in its own right just because
it is the past. Such a view is naive and can no longer be defended.
Every inquiry into the past is a quest to understand the present, a
statement about the values and prejudices and orientations of a part
of the present, certainly, including the inquirer’s present. Bloom’s
provocative arguments make clear that a part of the American present is preoccupied with a part of the legacy of antiquity (biblical
and therefore also Jewish, Greek, and Roman) as part of an effort
to explain, if not justify, certain contemporary American visions of,
and orientations to, the world. Thus, his arguments, whatever their
merit on substance, suggest the importance of a different orientation
for historical study, in biblical studies and in the history of religions
in general.
So I must stress again that it is now rather difficult for me as an
historian of Christian origins to begin historical inquiry at any point
other than in my present. So in scholarly form and in substance,
Bloom’s work very much resonates with me. There are few other issues of greater fascination, of heuristic significance and puzzlement
for scholarship (especially in the history of religions of Greco-Roman
antiquity), and for global sociopolitical dynamics, than that of the
fin de siècle resurgence of the attitudes and behaviors described by
Bloom.
Yet the most important reason that Bloom must be answered
is that on the matter of substance of argument, he is, if not wrong,
at least not provocative or radical enough. The dominant strand of
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American religion, albeit conservative, otherworldly, fundamentalist, and obsessively individualistic, need not be argued or assumed
to have its origins in, or even to be in fundamental solidarity with,
the Gnosticism and/or gnosis of late antiquity. This is so not only
because so much has happened between the two worlds to make
any causal argument anything other than problematic, but also
because most contemporary conservatives and fundamentalists in
the United States, their ancient Christian rhetoric notwithstanding,
are not otherworldly or antiworldly enough; they do not share that
comprehensive world-view so fundamental to many early Christians and self-styled Gnostics and others in late antiquity. They do
not share that “world”—complex, comprehensive, and radical in its
“outworldly”20 stance—that is associated with several groups and
movements of late antiquity, including early Christianities and, of
course, Gnosticism. This difference is important not for the sake
of the historian making points at the expense of a literary critic;
it is important because although Bloom may be correct in arguing
that the contemporary dominant strand of religion in the “religionsoaked,” “religion-mad” United States is the type that is obsessed by
radical freedom and solitude, it is not at all clear that this modern
American-defined freedom and solitude should be identified with,
or be seen as derivative of, ancient Gnostics and/or gnosis.
At any rate, the matter clearly warrants further examination.
But to argue as Bloom does is to fall into the trap of forcing historical connections of origins and influence and of finding similarity of
worldview on the basis of shared concepts, ideas, and language.21 It
is far better to attempt to account for the “American religion” within
the more comprehensive framework of the history of world-view or
mentalité.22
Contemptus mundi (contempt for the world) is an expression
that captures rather poignantly the complex of attitudes, behaviors,
and rhetorics of a part of many different cultures of Greco-Roman
antiquity and beyond. An examination of some of the late ancient
evidence and of some of the methodological issues involved will afford me the opportunity to engage an aspect of the issues raised by
Bloom and may provide a different perspective on African American
culture.
Contemptus Mundi As Matrix for the American Religion
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The expression contemptus mundi is a representation both for
a recognized historical literary expression—more broadly, a rhetorics or discourse—and a world-view. As a literary expression and
by extension rhetorics or discourse, it is most notably associated
with a certain type of literature that proliferated in the late Middle
Ages, especially during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, but then
shortly thereafter disappeared.23
As world-view and social orientation, contemptus mundi is
ancient in origins, dating back to the philosophers and visionaries of the worlds of the Far East and the eastern Mediterranean.
Found among many new, interstitial social formations or networks,
including the complex of movements that have come to be known as
early Judaism and Christianity, it has continued throughout a great
span of history to evoke a range of different aesthetic, sociopolitical, and religious responses.24 Initially appearing and developing
“between the cracks” of traditional formations in holistic societies,
these formations became reifications of transcendental visions.25
The philosophers, prophets, sages, seers, and wisdom teachers of the
“little societies” stretching from China, India, Mesopotamia, Egypt,
Arabia and all around the eastern and western Mediterranean from
roughly 800 B.C.E. to 700 C.E. (corresponding to K. Jaspers’s “Axial
Age”) came to define themselves as carriers of transcendental visions and impulses over against “the world.” The latter came to be
conceptualized and problematized as the realm of relations, mores,
traditions, and orientations in tension with the new visions or ideals,
the newly discovered “world above,” or “world to come,” the realm
of ideas, and so forth. The rhetorics of the visionaries, to be sure,
reflected great differences in cultures, social stations, and psychic
states. But it was always oppositional and often hyperbolic, suggesting the problematizing of the world as a fundamental or baseline
issue.
The historiography of early Christian representations and politics of what is here termed contemptus mundi has tended to explain
it away or apologize for it. This has been due to a rather narrow and
negative view of otherworldliness with the assumptions that the
sociopolitical ramifications of it are always either slight or negative
and that early Christianity developed inexorably and naturally from
a world-rejecting to world-embracing ethos.26

152 / Contemptus Mundi
But a rather different view is defensible. Ancient Christianity up
to Augustine can be understood as a complex of historical rhetorical
and social formations governed not by the inevitable turn toward
accommodation to the world but by the problematizating of the
world, often discussed in theological circles in terms of theodicy or
the problem of evil. What I am urging here is a different understanding of the dominant perspective among the earliest Christians. The
challenge here is to interpret the literary legacy and rhetorics of
early Christianity in such a way that the world-view that inspired
the continuing problematizing of the world can be surfaced and
understood.
The different conflicting orientations and the debates reflected
in extant ancient Christian literary sources can be understood in
light of the world-view that is contemptus mundi. But such a history
of ancient Christian contemptus mundi requires reconsideration of
old interpretive assumptions and schemata: it will no longer do to
assume, as does consensus scholarship, that ancient Christianity is
the dramatic history of the process of “catholicization,” “bourgeoisification,” or “world-accommodation.” An historical-rhetorical reading
of the relevant sources suggests that contemptus mundi remained
a fundamental assumption and ideological touchstone throughout
the period of ancient Christianity in spite of internal differences
and external opposition and disgust. How to come to speak about
it, how on the one hand, to justify it, to radicalize it in defensive
response, how on the other hand, to explain it away, to temper and
domesticate it in response to heightened sensitivities about outsiders’ reviews—these would be matters of much debate, thus, impetus
for rhetorical experimentation and enormous literary productivity.27
The manifestations of ancient Christian contemptus mundi were
numerous and diverse enough that a history and taxonomy of early
Christian renunciations and of renunciations in the ancient world
have been thought possible.28 We are still without an interpretive
history of early Christianity that attempts to account for its different “responses to the world” as reflected through the different types
and nuances of its rhetorics and discourses.
James M. Robinson’s schema for the major early Christian understandings of “world” set forth in a 1968 essay is a useful beginning that points to some of the significant general methodological
and theoretical challenges.29 His argument about the need to “trace
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understandings of world as they come into language” pinpoints one of
the major specific methodological challenges to be faced in the effort
to account for the complex development that was early Christianity,
an analysis of its rhetorics, especially its rhetorics of renunciation.
A fathoming of such rhetorics is likely to help greatly in clarifying
the whole range of dynamics in early Christianity. Robinson’s call
for attention to the manner in which the language among the early
Christians reflects the different “understandings of existence” among
them was justified. But he would no doubt be quick to admit now
that he did not develop or adopt a conceptual model of language and
discourse strategy such that the analysis of early Christian rhetorics
and discourses in early Christian texts would make sense in terms
of the larger world of language theory and play or of rhetorical and
social formation.
Thus, yet another beginning effort to sort through some of the
understandings of the world within early Christianity with a sensitivity to the longue dureé and to comparative religions is in order.
Only a summary sketch of a few snapshots that are nonetheless
loaded with complex interactions and issues can be supplied here.
Against the radical renunciations of a minority (the pneumatic
elites) in Corinth, Paul’s famous and haunting hos me (as if not)
exhortations, framed by the two “otherworldly” eschatological
pronouncements—”the time is short [ho kairos sunestalmenos estin]... the form of this world is passing away [paragei gar to schema
tou kosmou toutou]” (1 Cor. 7:29a, 31b)—may actually represent a
more worldly “world.” Despite the sharp differences in evidence
throughout the chapter, it can be argued that all parties in the debate
presume that Christian existence entails, even requires, some sort
of renunciation of the world. The real challenge, then, becomes that
of identifying, sorting out, and accounting for the different types of
renunciations and why certain parties argue for certain types.30
The Johannine community, defining itself with the rhetorically
dualistic, absolutist, and mantralike “not . . . of this world” nevertheless was the matrix of a history of quarrels between factions
representing a range of views regarding engagement of the world.
From the docetic disgust with association with the physical to the
physically graphic imagings and remembrances of Jesus, this loosely
defined community represented one of the most robust debates about
Christian identity and orientation to the world in antiquity. In spite
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of what appears to have been fairly universal group acceptance of
a language of world enmity and world renunciation, the politics of
world renunciation remained rather slippery.31
The so-called worldly-defensive, conservative-bourgeois authors
of the Pastoral Letters present an interesting hermeneutical challenge. Although their polemics seem to reflect the sensibilities and
orientations of acceptance of the world and acceptance by the world,
a second look is warranted. The evidence of the Pastorals themselves
and corroborating evidence of near-contemporary texts from the
same region suggest instead that the authors of the Pastorals and
the few individuals who were in solidarity with them hardly gained
acceptance by the contemporary world-embracing and established
citizens in second-century urban Asia Minor. I think they protested
too much; they were very defensive and thereby betrayed all too
clearly their own “outworldly” sensibilities and the perception of others that they were such. To be sure, the women who had renounced
the traditional domestic roles expected of them, including sexual
relations and family life, were a great shock to all. But the authors
of the Pastorals seemed not to be aware of just how consonant was
their general religious worldview, including, for example, the teaching that the end of the world was near, with the responses on the part
of the ascetic women and men. In other words, the theology espoused
by the authors of the Pastorals was itself world-renouncing. The
debate that developed was not about whether renunciation of the
world in general was appropriate, but about which type and what
degree of renunciation, in light of prejudices and political power
considerations, was appropriate.32
The communities behind the apocryphal acts and “gnostic” documents—arguably the most radical among the earliest Christians in
their expressions of contemptus mundi—considered their enemies to
be all others, including other believers who had not been initiated
into their inner circle and pledged a life of uncompromising solidarity with them and, of course, the same degree of enmity with the
world. Yet it is precisely the politics of their radical asceticisms—the
exclusion and elitism, the competition, as well as the liberationist
and class struggle undertones—that reflect the complexity—namely,
the politics and hermeneutics—of their “worldliness.”33
Finally, one of the most powerful examples of the complexity of
early Christian contemptus mundi is Augustine. Usually considered
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a “worldly” figure by most scholarly interpretive measurements, he
can be better understood as advancing contemptus mundi in his
mature, perhaps most influential work, The City of God. Insofar as
he encouraged the desacralization and depolitization of the empire,
he encouraged contemptus mundi—in fact, of every empire or social
and political order, whether headed by a Constantine or a Julian!34
For Augustine, pace Eusebius, there could be no establishment court
theology. The notion of a “Christian” empire was absurd, a contradiction in terms. The Christian must always be a pilgrim and stranger
(peregrinus), one who models contemptus mundi.35
These few examples of contemptus mundi raise important
questions—questions about the complexity of understandings and
expressions of contemptus mundi, about the methodological challenges involved in isolating or charting the course of these different
expression, and about the social and political ramifications of such
expressions.
Yet the challenge to investigate the rhetorics of renunciation in
early Christianity does not go far enough in terms of comparativist
and cultural-critical perspectives. By definition, the world-view that
is contemptus mundi is cross-cultural. Thus, the study of it should
be cross-cultural. So even if the focus remains on developments in
Christianity, it is important that such focus consistently respect the
broader histories of religions and histories of cultural formation and
development and draw upon the nuances and variations that such
histories will evidence. There are already some exciting advances in
this area in the comparative investigation of the origins and worldly
political effect of the transcendentalist impulses and visions.36
The pervasive force of contemptus mundi within transcendental
communities in general and in early Christianity in particular suggests that religion is rhetorical and social formation, viz. attempts to
realize within the dynamics and orientations and language of social
collectivities particular world-views. This suggests in agreement with
Robinson the possibility of a history of religions that would focus on
the shifts, the rising and falling of “world”—of world construction
and world-orientation. That a basis for a more consistent framework
for the comparative study of religion is latent within this scholarly
agenda is clear and should be encouraged for this reason alone. But
beyond Robinson’s suggestions, I would argue that with contemptus
mundi an entirely different set of heuristic categories and typologies
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suggests itself in the interpretation of all transcendental religions.
The Ascetics of Late Modern Social Formation and the
Social Formation of Late Ancient Asceticisms
In contemptus mundi is not only a key to a clearer understanding
of a quite popular late ancient rhetorics and world-view; it is also a
provocative challenge to modern sensibilities. The African negotiation of the New World that has become the United States could be
understood as a complex historical and contemporary phenomenon
that represents an exemplum of modern world (de)construction.
New alternate worlds are psychically and socioculturally experienced and defined, representing at the level of the individual what
literary critic Houston Baker and poet-essayist-historian Edward
Brathwaite have termed the “self-in-marronage,”37 what at the collective historical level I term “cultural marronage.” From this site
of marronage, of flight from as well as resistance to the world that
is “hard,” everything is experienced and engaged as an-other world;
all those in solidarity are understood to be “bound for the Promised
Land.” The dominating world is deconstructed and is held under
suspicion and in contempt—renounced. Orientation to “the world”
and relations within the marooned communities are viewed in terms
of ascetics, as offensive and defensive tactics, as the disciplines and
arts of the maintenance and politics of sociocultural formation.
So when the African-American story is included, Bloom’s argument about contemporary “religion-soaked,” “religion-mad” United
States—obsessed by radical freedom and solitude, identified with, or
seen as derivative of, ancient Gnosticism—must be reexamined and
nuanced. Far beyond Bloom’s and most social scientific assumptions
about social conditions as determinants, the African American story
suggests the importance of a “sociology of hope,”38 a more complex
reading of the mutuality of influence in the dynamics between social conditions and otherworldly visions and hopes and new social
formations. This sociology suggests enormous implications for the
study of early Christianities. The latter can be understood as a complex of sociocultural formations, their devotees’ self-understanding
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and orientation summed up by the expression contemptus mundi.
Moreover, the African-American story suggests the importance of a
full range of cultural expressiveness among the arts of resistance for
the sake of both the mastery and deformation39 of dominant cultural
formation.
So the ascetics of a late modern sociocultural formation suggests the sociocultural functions and expressivity of late ancient
religious asceticisms. And late ancient religious asceticisms in turn
suggest the sociocultural effects and expressivity of late modern religious hope. The historical religiocritical study of both late ancient
asceticisms and a late modern sociocultural formation as exempla
of cultural marronage thus proves to be productive of the historical tracings and cross-cultural isolation and characterization of a
religious orientation. Such a production can claim to be a modest
contribution to religious and theological studies at the end of the
century.
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